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III.
A.

ARGUMENT

T H I S COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT THAT THE
DISTRICT'S FINAL RULES IMPOSE AN IMPACT F E E .

In this matter, there are two questions presented: (1) whether a special district's
fee that is required as a condition of putting in a water system—in this case for a possible
subdivision—is an impact fee even though the special district itself does not grant
subdivision approval, but does give written authorization to approve the water system;
a id (2), whether that fee, if it indeed is an impact fee, loses its character as an impact fee
if .t is collected by a municipality—in this case Toquerville City—in connection with
wrLten subdivision plat approval by the municipality. The trial court below said yes to
both questions, determining that in the first instance the fee would be an impact fee, but
in the second instance, because the fee was collected by a municipality, the special
district did not give "written authorization" in connection with development approval
within Me meaning of the statute and therefore the fee was not an impact fee. See R.
193-195; see also Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-102(4).
As to the first question, the trial court agreed with the argument of Respondent's
counsel as explained by him at the October 18, 2001 hearing. R. 357, T. 29:12—3L17.1
The trial co irt rejected Petitioner's argument that installation of a water system does not
in and of itself create a greater demand for public facilities, R. 357, T. 24:19-23, and
therefore is not approval of a development activity. The trial court reasoned:

1

For the Court': convenience, copies of the cited portions of the transcript are attached as
Exhibit 1.

The District [Petitioner] bases much of its argument on the fact that
it does not encourage developers to apply to it for secondary water
service and that any such application is "voluntary." The District
emphasizes that it will not even accept an application without proof
that the applicant has been refused service by the "community" in
which the applicant's property is located. Neither of these
arguments is material to the issue presented to the Court, however.
The District's Petition prays for the Court to determine whether the
District's Final Rules impose impact fees, without reference to
Keystone or any other particular applicant. The District's ability to
reject an application because, for example, the applicant has not
been refused service by his community, does not mean that the
availability fee that the District may have imposed is or is not an
impact fee. If the Final Rules do improperly impose impact fees, the
problem is not corrected by the District's insistence that its system
be the developer's "last resort." Consequently, the Court's
determination in this case must assume that someone has applied or
will apply to the District for service under circumstances which
require the District to make a decision about the application,
(emphasis in original).
R. 191, 192. Based upon that assumption that someone will apply for service, which
assumption again was made in the context of a Petition by the District for declaratory
relief, and following Keystone's argument the trial court said:
Keystone first argues that the availability fee is an impact fee
because (i) the District, which is a local political subdivision, owns
and operates a secondary water system, which includes public
facilities for "water supply, treatment, and distribution," and (ii)
Keystone's construction of a "subdivision secondary water system"
is "construction or expansion of a . . . structure . . . that creates
additional demand and need for public facilities" and is, therefore, a
development activity, (iii) the District requires Keystone to obtain
the District's written authorization, or development approval, before
commencing construction of a secondary water system for
Keystone's property if it is to be connected to the District's system,
and (iv) Keystone must pay the District's availability fee as a
condition of obtaining the District's development approval.
R. 192, 193.

The Trial court agreed with Keystone that its "construction of the secondary water
system on its own property creates additional demand and need for public facilities." R.
193. Accordingly, the District's "availability fee," as reasoned by the trial court, is an
impact fee as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-102(7). In its Responsive Brief,
however, the District now argues that the Trial court lacked adequate facts upon which to
base its rulings—both of them—and that the trial court's reasoning is not sound.
MATERIAL FACTS
The material facts properly in the record can be summarized as follows:
1.

Petitioner "at all times relevant hereto has been a political subdivision of

the State of Utah . . . existing . . . by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1401 et seq. and
is located in Washington County, Utah." R. 1. f 3.
2.

The District owns and manages a secondary water system (the "System")

which presently supplies secondary irrigation water to residents of the Town of
Toquerville pursuant to an Agreement for Joint and Cooperative Action by and between
the District, the Town of Toquerville, and the Toquerville Irrigation Company dated
December 28, 1998. The System is capable of providing wholesale irrigation water
within the towns of LaVerkin and Toquerville (the "LaVerkin Creek Area")." R. 2, ^ 5.
3.

The District's primary method of providing water is as a wholesaler to

municipalities. R. 2, % 4. This it does by written contracts with the municipalities. R.
357, T. 26:24,25. No impact fee analysis is done. R. 357, T. 26:21-27:18.
4

The District does not concern itself with the price the municipalities in turn

charge developers for its water. R. 357, T. 14:13-16 ("We [the District] primarily

provide water to municipalities. And then they go on and do whatever business they do
with it. We primarily do that by way of contractual arrangements and the like."); R. 357,
T. 27:14-18.
5.

In selling water to municipalities under contract, the District does not

believe it is bound by any provision for reasonableness under the impact fee statute or
even this Court's analysis in Banberry Dev. Corp. v. South Jordan, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah
1981). Rather, in setting the price for the water, because it is based upon contract, it
believes that its only duty "in passing this fee under [the] water district statute is to be
rational... .We [the District] can't be so irrational that it would be appropriate for a court
to come in and substitute its judgment for the judgment of our court [board]." R. 357, T.
27:23-28:3.
6.

At some point, "it became apparent to [the District] that Keystone

Development would be likely coming to the District rather than to TSWS to obtain
secondary... water service." R. 357, T. 15:12-15. This was probably because Keystone
claims it has an agreement with the District directly to provide water—at least the District
admitted that that was the basis for the District's putting together its Rules, creating its
availability fee, and then filing the present Petition with the District Court. R. 357, T.
35:13-17,36:19,20.
TSWS—Toquerville Secondary Water System—is an entity that deals with delivery of
secondary water through a secondary water system to residents of Toquerville, composed
of a board with two members appointed by the District, two members appointed by the
City, and a fifth member appointed by the four existing members. It is based upon a
contract for delivery of water between the District and the City of Toquerville. R. 357, T.

7.

Regardless of the reason why the District sought judicial approval of its fee,

the District nonetheless filed its Petition attaching a copy of its rules, seeking "a Section
1442 'judicial examination and determination' pertaining to its availability fee, regardless
of who applies to it for service." R. 193 n.2; see also R. 1-4.
8.

Respondent, Keystone, is a property owner and developer within the City

of Toquerville and "is required to have a secondary water system in place in order to
obtain subdivision development approval from Toquerville." R. 190. Petitioner does not
object to this finding by the trial court. Brief of Appellee, at 35.
9.

If Keystone does not purchase secondary water directly from the District, it

will purchase water from TSWS or Toquerville to develop its property. R. 357, T. 1315. In that event, it will pay a fee for the water in connection with receiving written
subdivision approval. This fee is based upon the contract the municipality has with the
District. No impact fee analysis is done. The District "provide[s] water to [the]
municipality[]. And then they go on and do whatever business they do with it." R. 357,
14:14-15.
Based upon these facts the trial court concluded that the fee "somebody" would
have to pay if they purchased water directly from the District was an impact fee under the
statute. The Trial court's legal conclusions were correct. "Public facilities" within the
meaning of the Impact Fee Act, "means . . . capital facilities that have a life expectancy
often or more years and are owned or operated by or on behalf of a local political

14:20-15:10. It receives its water from the "System" referred to in paragraph 5 of the
District's Petition. R. 2 f 5.

subdivisio 1 . . . [involving] water rights and water supply, treatment, and distribution
facilities." Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-102(12). The District's "System" referred to in
paragraph 5 of its Petition, is a public facility. See also R. 357, T. 9:25-10:1, 20:15-18,
22:17-24.
Moreover, the District itself is a "local political subdivision" within the meaning
of the Impact Fee Act because it is a "special district created under Title 17A, Special
Districts." Utah Code Ann. § ll-36-102(8)(a). See also Material Fact No. 1 above.
Construction of a "structure, or use, [or] any change in use of... a structure" as
required by the District's Rules, see R. 7fflf3, 6, 8, 9, 10, "that creates additional demand
and need for public facilities" is a "development activity." Utah Code Ann. § 11-36102(3). The trial court correctly concluded that the construction of a secondary water
system to meet the District's specifications was a development activity within the
meaning of the Impact Fee Act. "Even if the District had so much existing service
capacity that it could absorb new connections without expanding its system, any
construction of new subdivision facilities which were to be connected to the District's
system would create additional demand on the District's system." R. 193 (emphasis in
original). Hence, the District's Rules regulate a "development activity."
Finally, the District will not allow connection to its system unless it inspects and
approves construction of the system "during installation." R. 11 f 10. This will only take
place if the applicant signs a water application and agreement with the District. R. 8 f 3.
Hence, the District's Rules provide for "development approval" within the meaning of
the Impact Fee Act. Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded, if the District

supplies water directly to "somebody" rather than to a municipality, and collects a fee
consistent with its Rules attached to its Petition, that fee is an impact fee because it is "a
payment of money imposed upon development activity as a condition of develoment
approval." Utah Code Ann. § ll-36-102(7)(a). Regardless how the Petitioner would
have this Court look at the facts in light of the Impact Fee Act, the availability fee
imposed by the Petitioner directly upon "someone" other than a municipality is an impact
fee. The trial court was precisely correct in its legal analysis and conclusion regarding
the first question presented. Accordingly, the trial court's decision as to the first question
presented should be affirmed.
Now, by way of specific response to some of the arguments made by Petitioner in
its Brief, whether Keystone's Trial Memorandum and its exhibits are admissible as
evidence or not makes little difference in light of the Material Facts outlined above. The
parties did not present evidence at the hearing on October 18, 2001, except by way of
proffer, because the parties at the hearing did not believe "the evidence . . . [was] in
dispute." R. 357, T.12:22. The trial court took the proffers of counsel along with
argument. That forms the basis of the record on appeal. Further, it is somewhat
disingenuous for Petitioner to argue that Respondent's Trial Memorandum should have
been ignored by the Court. Petitioner's counsel responded to the points raised in it
throughout Petitioner's presentation. See e ^ R. 357, T. 16:25, T. 17:21, 22, T. 18:9,
10, T. 23:23, 24, T. 25: 8-15. Moreover, for what it's worth, the Trial Memorandum was
not late as the trial court suggested. This was a hearing on a Petition, not a motion
hearing requiring courtesy copies to the court beforehand. A trial memorandum was not

even required, but was submitted strictly to assist the trial court. And indeed, the trial
court did rely on the Trial Memorandum. R. 190 f b.
Notwithstanding, given the Material Facts summarized above, which are entirely
supported either by the Petition or by proffers from Petitioner's counsel, the "facts" in the
Trial Memorandum are unnecessary. Nevertheless, if this Court finds that reference to
those facts is needed and that they are not properly in the record, this Court should
remand this matter with specific instructions regarding the legal issues raised in the
Petition. See Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, f 22, 20 P.3d 388; Bakanowski
v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App. 357, f 15, 80 P.3d 153. Respondent will have little
difficulty entering into evidence the contracts, city ordinances, etc., that are exhibits in
the Trial Memorandum.
In addition, the District claims that "[n]othing in Keystone's unfounded
allegations suggest that there might be even one connection to the District's system,
much less enough applicants to impact that system." Brief of Appellee at 38. The Trial
court flatly and properly rejected that argument. R. 191, 192. Keystone does not need to
prove that there will be a connection. The fact that someone will connect to the District's
system must be assumed otherwise the District's Petition is pointless. They are asking
this Court to tell them that their rules which set forth the conditions for water use and
connection to their system, are not impact fees, and now they say this Court and the trial
court cannot assume someone might get their water? Why is the District filing a Petition
with the trial court, seeking a declaratory ruling, if there is no chance of "even one
connection to the District's system?" Brief of Appellee at 38.

The District attempts to bog this Court down in a debate over whether or not 'wa
'need' would be created for the District to add more facilities to its system" and whether
or not the Trial court's Ruling could support such a finding. This debate is entirely
beside the point. The issue is if "someone" connects to the system. This "someone"
connecting to the system has already been anticipated by the District and is the very
purpose of the District's Rules and Petition being filed.3
The District is simply talking out of both sides of its mouth attempting to confuse
this Court. The fact is its availability fee clearly falls within the definition of an impact
fee and the trial court's conclusions in this regard should be affirmed.
B.

THIS COURT SHOULD DECLARE THE DISTRICT'S PASS-THROUGH FEE AN
IMPACT FEE BASED UPON THE RECORD BEFORE IT; BUT IF NOT, THIS COURT
SHOULD REMAND TO THE TRIAL COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LAW
SPECIFICALLY AS IT RELATES TO A PASS-THROUGH FEE.

1.

A Pass-Through Fee is an Impact Fee.

With the first question presented having been answered in the affirmative, namely,
that the District's fee charged directly to someone requesting service from its system as
more particularly described in its Rules, is an impact fee, then the next question becomes
relevant: Does that fee change its character if it is collected by a municipality instead of
the District in connection with subdivision approval?
This issue was squarely raised below by Keystone. See Keystone's Complaint,
copy attached to Appellant's blue brief as Exhibit 1, e.g., fflf 16, 32-34, 40 n.7; see also
R. 64-68; R. 357, T. 59:15-60:9. Further, this point was argued extensively by Petitioner.
3

Even by the District's own admission, this "someone" is probably Keystone. R. 357, T.

R. 357, T. 16:22-17:2, 26:17-27:5, 69:6-70:20. Moreover, the Trial court ruled on this
issue and reasoned as follows:
Keystone's alternative argument is that (i) Toquerville will not
approve Keystone's subdivision activity unless Keystone has a
secondary water system; (ii) the District has the only secondary
water system from which Keystone could obtain service, (iii) the
District will not allow Keystone to obtain service unless Keystone
pays the availability fee, and (iv) the statutory definition of "impact
fee" as one imposed "as a condition of development approval" does
not require that the fee be demanded by or paid to the body giving
the development approval. This argument does not appear to be
sound. If Keystone's "development activity" is the subdivision
generally, and if Keystone must apply to the District for service
because no other such service is available and that service is a
condition of Toquerville's approval of Keystone's subdivision, the
District's approval of Keystone's application is a necessary predicate
to Toquerville's approval of the subdivision but it is not a "written
authorization . . . that authorizes the commencement of development
activity" and, therefore, the District's approval is not "development
approval." Even though, contrary to the District's argument, the
District's approval of an application for secondary water service
does affect the municipality's subdivision development approval, it
does not constitute "development approvel" which would make the
District's availability fee constitute an impact fee. (footnote
omitted).
R. 194, 195. The Trial court compared this fee to a fee a developer would pay for
a "contractor's license and a business license in order to obtain Toquerville's approval of
the developer's subdivision" and stated that that "would not mean that the fees paid to the
State Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing for the contractor's license
and to the Town Clerk for the business license are 'impact fees.'" R. 194 n.3.
The facts relied upon by the Trial court in the above analysis were included in the
record. Fact no. (i) was not objected to by Petitioner in its brief. Brief of Appellee at 35.

36:19,20.

As to fact no. (i), it is not necessarily in the record that the District has the "only"
secondary water system, but it does have a system, Material Fact nos. 2, 6 and 8, and as
the trial court said: "the Court's determination in this case must assume that someone has
applied or will apply to the District for service under circumstances which require the
District to make a decision about the application.5' R. 192. Fact no. (iii) above is
apparent from the District's Rules attached to its Petition. R. 7 ^f 4. Finally, fact no. (iv)
is a mere recitation and analysis of the Impact Fee Act. No evidentiary support is needed.
Accordingly, this argument is not unsupported in the record. Neither is it based upon
unreasonable assumptions as Petitioner would suggest.
In its analysis, however, the trial court was plainly in error. The fee for a
contractor's license or a business license is unlike the fee paid for the District's water: it
is not paid as a condition or using the Trial court's words "a necessary predicate" to
subdivision plat approval. R. 194. The developer has only one reason for paying the fee
o Toquerville for the water: obtaining secondary water so his subdivision will be
J pproved. A developer might have a myriad other reasons for obtaining a contractor's
1 cense or a business license that may never involve subdivision plat approval. Again,
"r ^oquerville will not approve Keystone's subdivision development activity unless
KA ystone has a secondary water system." Fact no. (i) above. R. 194. Approval of the
subdivision, including the water system therein, is a "development activity" within in the
plaLi language of the Impact Fee Act. Utah Code Ann. §§ 11-36-102(3) and (12).
"Wri ten authorization from a local political subdivision" includes written authorization
from the "municipality," i.e., Toquerville. Utah Code Ann. §§ 11-36-102(4) and (8).

Moreover, this fee is unlike what would be paid to a utility company although
installation of the utilities and connection to their service may likewise be a condition for
subdivision approval. Utilities are carefully regulated by the state. Their fees are
monitored. Further, they are not "local political subdivisions" within the Impact Fees
Act. Utah Code Ann. § 1 l-36-102(8)(a). Consequently, an analogy to a utility company
is inapposite.
Nothing in the Impact Fees Act, and Petitioner has pointed to nothing, suggests
that the local political subdivision that authorizes the development activity must be the
same local political subdivision that imposes conditions that govern the development
activity. Nothing in the Impact Fees Act requires that the local political subdivision
collecting the fee cannot do so on behalf of the local political subdivision that imposes
conditions that govern the development activity. Local political subdivisions collect fees
for each other frequently, such as the case of a municipality and a special service district,
while at the same time, it is the service district that regulates the particular development
activity, e.g., special service districts for sewer or water. Petitioner recognized this at the
hearing before the Trial court. R. 357, T. 69:6-70:20. Moreover, an example of this is in
the statute itself. Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-202(8). The statutory definition of an impact
fee merely refers to a "condition of development approval" with no reference to who sets
the conditions.
Accordingly, this Court should rule that the answer to the second question
presented is that a fee paid as a condition of development approval does not lose its

character as an impact fee even though it is collected by another local political
subdivision.
Petitioner may argue, as it did before the trial court, that Keystone will not be
coming to the District for secondary water because the District fulfilled its contract with
Keystone by implementing the TSWS. Keystone must come to TSWS to receive its
water. See R. 357, T. 36:13-17, 19, 20. First, in response to that argument, that fact if it
were true, is immaterial to the District's Petition. This Court, as did the trial court, must
assume that someone will be coming to the District for secondary water. Second, even
assuming that fact to be true, the District cannot side step the requirements of the Impact
Fee Act because it sets its fee by contract with municipalities and "then they go on and do
whatever business they do with it." £ee Material Fact No. 4 above. Nothing in the
Impact Fees Act states that the fee paid to the local service district must be pro rated to
what the municipality received for the water. As long as the Petitioner receives a fee for
its water and the use of its system, and as long as that water and system is a condition of
obtaining subdivision plat approval, the fee collected from the developer is an impact fee.
Indeed, the District has been charging municipalities in Washington County for its
water and use of its system for some time. R. 357, T. 26:22-25, 27:17,18. Such a passthrough fee, according to the District, "would not be an impact fee under the terms of the
Impact Fees Act." Brief of Appellee at 15. Accordingly, the District believes it can and
indeed has charged whatever it felt appropriate for its water, Material Fact No. 5 above,
without complying with the impact fees analysis or even the requirements articulated by
this Court in Banberry Dev. Corp. v. South Jordan, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981). This

contract fee is then paid to the District and nobody is the wiser. See e.g., R. 301 f 2; R.
303 (Ron Thompson, the District's manager, see also R. 357, T. 9:19-11:4, is
^particularly concerned that the Town [of Toquerville] has not implemented the
agreement by adopting the schedule of impact and other fees required by the agreement
and may have approved additional hookups to its system without properly notifying the
WCWCD and submitting the agreed upon fees. In regard to Calvin Lowe's subdivision
the Town is obligated under the agreement to pay the District a $1,500 water connection
fee for each lot in the subdivision within six months after approval of the subdivision
plat.") and compare R. 117 ^ f and R. 125. Nothing in the plain language of the Impact
Fee Act would suggest that a local political subdivision does not need to comply with the
act if it collects its fee from the authorizing political subdivision by contract. Whether
Keystone or "someone" pays the fee to the District directly for its water and use of its
system in connection with subdivision plat approval, or whether they pay the fee to a
municipality that gives it to the District pursuant to a contract, the fee paid is an impact
fee.
2.

THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER ALL THE FACTS IN THE RECORD
INCLUDING THE FACTS AND EXHIBITS SET FORTH IN KEYSTONE'S TRIAL
MEMORANDUM; IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THIS COURT SHOULD REMAND
THIS CASE WITH INSTRUCTIONS "TO POINT OUT, AND ADDRESS, ISSUES
WHICH MAY BECOME MATERIAL ON REMAND." BANKANOWSKIV.
BANKANOWSKI, 2003 UT APP 357 f 15.

The record at the trial court level evinces that all parties, including the trial court,
were confused as to the procedure required by Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1442. R. 357, T.

5:8-11, 8:14 through 9:34, 7-10. Prior to the Trial court's ruling, there was confusion as to
what the procedure was for hearing the District's Petition. Utah Code Ann. § 17A-21442 appears to say that the District files its Petition, gives notice, and then anybody who
wants to can show up for the trial, without any indication of an opportunity for discovery
or depositions. In the case at hand, Keystone was the only one who showed up to the
hearing. Notice of Petition and Hearing was sent out on August 15, 2001, and the trial
against all unknown entities or persons took place on October 18, 2001. R. 31-32. With
only nine weeks from petition to trial on such complicated matters, there is no time for all
affected persons and entities to find and hire counsel, file answers and conduct discovery
and depositions. If all of these basic rights normally afforded to Respondents/Defendants
do not exist under Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1442, then the trial court cannot be said to
have erred by considering Keystone's trial memorandum and accompanying exhibits.
At the trial before the trial court on October 18, 2001, both parties made reference
to and arguments based on the exhibits attached to both the petition and the trial
memorandum. Neither party objected to the other party's referencing of these exhibits,
and neither party specifically moved to have said exhibits admitted into evidence. See R.
357. T. 16:25, 17:21, 22, T. 18:9,10, T. 23:23, 24, T. 25;8-15, T. 29:12-31:7. The District
now claims there is no foundation for Keystone's exhibits. If this is the case, the same
holds true for the exhibits in the District's Petition. The District argues that their exhibits
are acceptable because they were attached to a verified petition, even though no

4

Even though this quote is attributed to the District's counsel, it appears that it is actually
the trial court speaking at some point. Keystone believes that began on page 8, line 14.

foundation or testiniony was given at the hearing, but that Keystone's Trial Memorandum
exhibits should not be considered, even though Keystone was at the hearing and prepared
to lay foundation for the documents. The District cannot have it both ways. To follow
the District's argument would force this Court to conclude that the entire trial court
proceeding would have to be thrown out and the parties should then go back to square
one for a new trial. If this Court does find such to be the case, this Court should remand
with specific instructions on Section 1442 so all parties and the trial court know what
procedure to follow under this statute.
Clearly the trial court was troubled by the nature of the proceedings. Thus it was
not in error for the trial court to consider all possible scenarios and reasonable
hypotheticals as to how someone might come to the District for water under its rules—
cither directly '"just because" or directly in connection with subdivision approval through
a municipality. The trial court, in evaluating Keystone's trial memorandum and exhibits
diil not have to believe the facts to be true or authentic, but merely whether they raise a
rea: onable scenario that may arise when deciding on a judgment of a declaratory nature.
Keystone, being the only entity to "appear and demur," suggested that the trial
court continue the matter. "And so, as far as between us, we would prefer to continue the
matter intil the court has time to review the trial memorandum until the court has time to
be more prepared to go through and see what we have here." R. 357, T. 6:23-7:1.
Nevertheess, the trial court proceeded and Keystone still prevailed in defeating the
District's Petition. It is simply unfair for the District to say now what Keystone "should
have" or "could have" done at the hearing, when the District and trial court did not know

the proper procedure. Keystone followed the statute, in that it any "owner of property in
the district or person interested in the contract or proposed contract may appear and
demur to or answer the petition at any time prior to the date fixed for the hearing or
within such further time as may be allowed by the court." Utah Code Ann. § 17A-21442.
Finally, section 1442 states that the "court shall disregard any error, irregularity or
omission which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties." (emphasis added).
Keystone is uncertain as to what this is supposed to mean, but if there was any
irregularity by the trial court's later considering Keystone's Trial Memorandum, then
perhaps the trial court doing so falls under this section. The District's "substantial rights"
were not affected by the trial court's later considering Keystone's Trial Memorandum
once the trial court better understood the process, or lack thereof, pursuant to the statute.
Regardless of what the trial court did or did not consider, Keystone believes that
this Court can affirm the finding of an impact fee in that the only requirements was for
the trial court to look at the District's Rules, look at the Impact Fee Act, and determine
whether there was an impact fee. The trial court did so, and the District failed to
convince the trial court that its availability fee was not an impact fee.
In addition to the Petition, the District also submitted Final Rules and Regulations
for Secondary Retain Water Service for the La Verkin Creek Area, and the Availability,
User & Standby Fee Analysis for the Washington County Water Conservancy District La Verkin Creek Irrigation System. R. 7-30. Based on the Petition and these documents
alone, the trial court could have determined that the fees to be imposed were impact fees

under the Impact Fees Act given that the District has admitted that "Keystone is required
to have a secondary water system in place in order to obtain subdivision development
approval from Toquerville Town." Brief of Appellee p. 35.
Finally, the record clearly shows that the trial court conferred with counsel in an
off the record discussion to work out the facts in the trial court's mind. R. 185. It was
after this discussion that the trial court issued its Ruling.
In the event this Court concludes that the record before it is inadequate, it should
remand this case with instructions to the trial court addressing both questions presented:
First, what does the Impact Fee Act require for an impact fee if Keystone comes directly
to the District for water under the District's Rules, and second, is that fee still an impact
fee if Keystone comes to the District for water as a condition of subdivision approval,
when the approval is granted by a municipality. Further, and thirdly, because the District
has made clear that it sells water to municipalities by contract—throughout Washington
County, R. 26:22-25, R.27:17, 18—and that it washes its hands then of the fee the
municipality charges (which argument is somewhat disingenuous given the Lowe
Affidavit, R. 300), and because that is an issue that affects most if not all residents of
Washington County and a recurring issue, this Court has a duty to address this issue on
remand as well.
Citing this Court's decision in Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, the
Utah Court of Appeals, when dealing with an issue that was certain to resurface on
remand said:

Because this issue is certain to resurface on remand and because the
parties cite the inclusion of savings alimony as a recurring topic in
alimony disputes, we will address whether savings/retirement
deposits may ever be considered as part of the needs analysis in an
alimony determination.
2003 UT App 357 f 15. Then citing Bair, the Court of Appeals said: "[A]n appellate
court has a duty to point out, and address, issues which may become material on remand
even where a separate issue was dispositive to the resolution of the appeal." Id. So it is
with the above three issues. If this Court finds that the record before it is inadequate to
make a decision on the above issues, it should remand this case for further proceedings
before the trial court, but in doing so—it is clear how the trial court would rule below—
this Court must give legal guidance and address these issues. The District cannot be
allowed to side step the requirements of the Impact Fees Act by entering into contracts
with municipalities and then ignore the plain language of the Act.
3.

This Matter is Ripe for Decision.

One of two options must be the case: (1) either somebody cannot get secondary
water from Toquerville and therefore they come to the District or (2) the District created
its Rules, and then proceeded to file a Petition with the courts seeking declaratory relief
for absolutely no reason. The trial court, finding the first option to be more pliable, found
that u the Court's determination in this case must assume that someone has applied or will
apply to the District for service under circumstances which require the District to make a
decision about the application." R. 192.
The District argues that this matter is not ripe for adjudication because Keystone
has not asked the District for water, and has neither been asked to nor paid a upass

through fee." Brief of Appellee, at 26. The District cites several cases to support its
position as to when an issue becomes ripe. However, the issue at hand is different than
the District's cited cases because those cases were not brought, in part, under Utah Code
17A-2-1442. That statute allows the District to file Petitions seeking declaratory relief
allowing a "judicial examination and determination of... proceeding or contract of the
district, whether or not the contract shall have been executed, including proposed
contracts . . . and the petition shall be taken as confessed by all persons who fail so to
appear."5 Thus, if Keystone had done as the District suggests by waiting until it received
a bill from the District, the District would be before this Court arguing that it is too late to
challenge the fee because the District's petition would have already been "confessed"
against Keystone. This matter is ripe for this Court's decision.
C.

KEYSTONE SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS ATTORNEYS' FEES.

The District argues that Keystone should not be awarded its attorneys' fees
because the matter at hand "was brought by the District pursuant to Section 1442. It was
not brought under Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-401." Brief of Appellee p. 32. However, this
argument would require this Court to find it possible for the trial court to issue a
declaratory judgment on whether or not the District's Rules constituted an impact fee,
without taking into account the "Impact Fees Act" of Title 11, Chapter 36.
Furthermore, in addition to Section 1442, Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-101 et seq. is
the foundation for both the District's Petition and Keystone's Complaint.

5

It is also worth noting that Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1442 was enacted in 2000, which
is after all the District's cited cases in support of its position.

1.

The District's Entire Claim for Relief in its Petition is Based
Upon Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-101 et seq.

The District claims that the issue of whether or not their Rules constituted an
impact fee, was "not brought under Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-401." Brief of Appellee at
32. This is contrary to the District's own Petition. In fact, the District's entire "Claim for
:lelief' in its Petition is based upon the Impact Fee Act:
WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests the court to determine and
declare that the "Final Rules and Regulations for Secondary Retail Water
Service for the La Verkin Creek Area" as amended on July 17, 2001, do not
impose impact fees under Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-101 et seq. and that the
Rules are within the power of the District and constitute a valid act
pursuant to a valid proceeding of the District, (emphasis supplied).
R. 4. Furthermore, Paragraph 10 of the District's Petition further states as follows:
Utah Code Ann. § 1 l-36-102(7)(a) states:
"Impact fee" means a payment of money imposed upon
development activity as a condition of development approval.
R. 3. F nally, Paragraph 12 of the District's Petition states that the "fees charged
by the D;strict under the Rules are not impact fees under Utah Code § 11-36-101
et seq." Jc 4. The Trial court clearly disagreed with the District, finding that the
"District's availability fee does constitute an impact fee under the Impact Fees
Act." R. 11 3-194 (emphasis added).
Because the Impact Fees Act is the basis of the District's Petition as well as the
Trial court's luling, Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-401(5), which allows for attorneys' fees
under the Act is applicable. Keystone believes that the trial court erred in failing to
award Keyston i its attorneys' fees. The District filed its Petition against an unknown and

unascertainable number of Respondents. Keystone alone appeared to challenge the
District's Petition, and prevailed. It should not be the responsibility of private individuals
and/or businesses to force quasi-governmental entities to obey the laws set by the
Legislature. Nevertheless, Keystone was forced to do so, and prevailed. For this reason,
Keystone should be awarded its attorneys' fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 11-36401(5).
2.

Keystone's Complaint also seeks a Declaration Under Utah Code
Ann. § 11-36-101 et. seq.

Keystone's Complaint also seeks relief under Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-101 et seq.,
further supporting Keystone's claim that the trial court erred in failing to award Keystone
its attorneys' fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-401(5). The District attempts to
discredit Keystone's claim for attorneys' fees in that "[n]owhere does the complaint cite
to 11-36-401(1) or (4) as the basis for Keystone's standing to sue." Brief of Appellee at
32. In making such a statement, the District ignores Keystone's prayer for relief which
seeks "a declaration that Defendant's fee is an impact fee subject to the Utah Impact Fee
Act," i.e., Utah Code Ann § 11-36-101 et seq. References to Title 11, Chapter 36 of the
Utah Code are additionally found in Paragraphs 7, 9, 10, 12, 20, 37, 40, 41, 42c, and 43
of Keystone's Complaint. See Brief of Appellant Exhibit 1. Keystone's Complaint
further prayed for "an award of attorney's fees as allowed by law." See id. at 14. The
District's claim that Keystone should be denied its attorneys' fees for failing to
specifically cite Section 401 is disingenuous.

The District contends that no "proceedings have been held pursuant to Keystone's
complaint." Brief of Appellee at 32. This is simply untrue. Keystone's first cause of
action was to seek a declaration that the District's "fee is an impact fee subject to the
Utah Impact Fee Act." Brief of Appellant, Exhibit 1 f 43. The trial court's Ruling then
found that the "District's availability fee does constitute an impact fee under the Impact
Fees Act." R. 191-194.
At the beginning of the trial court's hearing on October 18, 2001, the trial court
recognized that there were "a couple of consolidated cases," that being the District's
Petition and Keystone's Complaint, which had been consolidated pursuant to an Order to
Consolidate. R. 35; R. 357, T. 3:9,10. At the hearing on October 18th, the parties agreed
that the hearing would be limited to "the issue of whether or not the fees that [the District
has] imposed meet the statutory definition of what is an impact fee." R. 357, T. 4:10-11;
see also R. 146. Surely the District does not suggest that the October 18, 2001 Order that
limits the issues to "the legal question of whether or not the fee imposed by the . . .
District as part of its Rules . . . is or is not an impact fee" means that that issue was
decided on the basis of the Petition alone, excluding the first cause of action in
Keystone's Complaint. R. 146. The impact fee issue was specifically part of the hearing
on October 18th; it was only "all other issues" that were left for later determination. Id.
The District's Petition sought a ruling that their fee was not an impact fee. Keystone
sought a ruling that the District's fee was an impact fee. The District now attempts to
argue that only the District's Petition was at issue as to whether or not the fee was an
impact fee. Such logic means that Keystone's position on the impact fee would be

reserved for a later date, even though it was the same issue as found in the District's
Petition. Surely it was neither the parties', nor the trial court's, intent to determine
whether or not the District's fee was an impact fee, only so that they could all once again
determine the same issue at a later date.
Finally, the District argues that Keystone's Complaint "has never been perfected
or heard, because the District's motion to dismiss that complaint has never been ruled
on." Brief of Appellee p. 32. This is simply not the case in that at the time the District's
motion was filed, the trial court had already heard Keystone's Complaint with respect to
its first cause of action regarding the impact fees.
The trial court consolidated the District's Petition and Keystone's Complaint, via
an Order to Consolidate on September 18, 2001. R. 35. The trial court then had a
hearing on October 18, 2001, regarding the District's Petition, and the first cause of
action of Keystone's Complaint, as they related of the issue of impact fees. R. 357. The
District then filed its motion to dismiss in lieu of an Answer on October 30, 2001. R.
147. Keystone filed its response on November 21, 2001, and the District filed its reply
on December 10, 2001. R. 156, 174. The trial court then issued its Ruling agreeing with
Keystone and granting relief on Keystone's First Cause of Action on January 15, 2002,
thus effectively ruling on the District's motion, rending said motion moot.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The trial court's ruling that the District's Water Availability Fee imposed by its
Rules is an impact fee should be affirmed. The trial court erred, however, in finding that
that fee loses its character as an impact fee if the written authorization for development

activity is granted by another local political subdivision, such as a municipality.
Moreover, the District should not be allowed to circumvent the Impact Fees Act by
entering into contracts with local municipalities and then washing its hands from what the
local municipalities charge for the District's water. If this Court is persuaded that the
record is inadequate to rule on these issues, it should rule on what it can and remand to
the trial court with instructions and legal analysis on these issues. Finally, Keystone
should be awarded its attorney's fees and costs for successfully defending the District's
Petition as well as successfully bringing its own Complaint, and should further be
awarded its attorney's fees and costs on appeal.
DATED this H/ifay of January 2004.
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1

October 18, 2001.

St. George, Utah.

2

PROCEEDINGS

3

THE COURT:

Just now time to move on to the case of

4

Washington County Water Conservancy District and Keystone

5

Conversions, LLC.

6

(Whereupon, an off the record discussion took place.)

7

THE COURT:

Now, on the water conservancy district vs.

8

Keystone, Hjelle is here for the petitioner, Mr. Reece for the

9

respondent.

There, apparently, are a couple of consolidated

10

cases.

I have case file for number 1616.

11

what this case is about or what you are planning to do today.

12

MS. HJELLE:

13

THE COURT:

14

MS. HJELLE:

And I don't know

Your Honor?
Go ahead.
I think what we have before you today is

15

our petition for a ruling on the initial case which was filed/

16

which is the board of trustees of Washington County Water

17

Conservancy District vs. Keystone Conversions —

18

Keystone Conversions as respondent.

19

there.

20

today would be limited to the issue of whether or not the fees

21

which have been imposed pursuant to a rule that is attached to

22

our petition.

23

petition and the exhibits.

24

parties have also stipulated that the district has the power to

25

make and enforce all reasonable rules and regulations for the

no, with

That's why I got confused

The parties have reached a stipulation that the hearing

And I do have an extra copy for the court of our
It is, in fact, an impact fee.

The

management, control, delivery, use and distribution of its
water.

So Keystone has raised some additional issues both in

its answer to our petition and in its separate complaint which
was consolidated.

And I'll (inaudible) characterize it other

than I will say they focus primarily on whether or not the
actions that we took were in fact arbitrary and capricious or
illegal for some other reason.

And we have stipulated that

those issues can be reserved for later, to be addressed later
in the proceedings.

So right now before the court is solely

the issue of whether or not the fees that we have imposed meet
the statutory definition of what is an impact fee.
Fair statement?
MR. REECE:

Fair, yeah.

Your Honor, did the court

—

I had this hand delivered up to the court yesterday morning.
You didn't get a copy of the trial memorandum
THE COURT:

Oh, it came in yesterday.

(inaudible)?
I think you can

probably make the speech as well as I can now, Mr. Reece, on
that sort of thing.

So it's not much use to me coming in late

like that.
MR. REECE:

I think we can go through and outline the

issues before the court.
THE COURT:

Well, let me make something clear to you.

I do not have time to take another case under advisement.

If

this is an issue that involves materials that should have been
provided to me earlier than this so that I would have some idea

1

in advance what you are talking about, then this hearing will

2

have to be postponed.

3

And I am not in the position to be able to take on another

4

assignment as a case under advisement after hearing some

5
6

J

I haven't had the materials in advance.

smattering of evidence or argument here.

I just don't have

time to do it.

7

MR. REECE:

There is a very --

8

THE COURT:

And so if it's something that's narrow

9

enough that it's just simply a matter of some evidence and

10

argument here and a decision, that's fine.

11

digesting all of this, no, it's not.

12

MS. HJELLE:

But if it involves

Your Honor, we would certainly submit

13

that it is narrow enough.

It is simply a question of looking

14

at the definition of the statute, looking at the black and

15

white language of our regulation and saying, how do they

16

interrelate with one another?

17

meet the definition of the statute?

18

other arguments and issues raised in the trial memorandum are

19

simply irrelevant to that question.

Does our regulation meet or not
We would submit that any

20

THE COURT:

Okay.

21

MR. REECE:

My response to that, these are very

22

complicated issues.

23

memorandum.

24

morning as opposed to maybe two days prior to the hearing.

25

the issues are very complicated, as Mrs. -- or Ms. Hjelle

That's why we gave the court the trial

I apologize they got to the court yesterday
But

1

suggests.

2

what's happened there.

3

their minutes and their hearing both on June 12

4

July 17

5

take -- that's -- it's complicated.

6

(inaudible) arguments are, that's the end of it.

7

It's a matter of looking at the regulations, seeing
And the exhibits are in connection with

' and applying that to the statute.

THE COURT:

and on

Now, that would

It's not a matter
(Inaudible.)

I guess you know my next question, Mr.

8

Reece.

9

volume when you submitted it yesterday and it was delivered to

10

me yesterday afternoon?

11
12

What did you think I was going to do with this bound

MR. REECE:

I hoped that you would have a chance to

read it and (inaudible).

13

THE COURT:

When?

14

MR. REECE:

Yesterday afternoon.

15

THE COURT:

Let's be realistic, Mr. Reece.

16

MR. REECE:

The point I'm trying to make to the court

17

is this.

We are not going to be able to resolve this.

These

18

issues here, filed by the petitioner, were filed for a general

19

hearing on this date.

20

They published in three public places, I guess.

21

but required by the statute published this notice.

22

take record or note for the record there was no one here except

23

for my clients.

24

to continue the matter until the court has time to review the

25

trial memorandum until the court has time to be more prepared

They published notice in the paper.
(Inaudible)
Court can

And so, as far as between us, we would prefer

1

to go through and see what we have here.

2

this is too complicated for the court.

3

undoubtedly will be up on appeal.

4

ought to spend some time reviewing.

5

petition for this morning, Your Honor, the court, I think,

6

would be (inaudible) to spend the extra time, read through our

7

common memorandum and (inaudible).

8
9

THE COURT:

My point simply is,
It!s an issue that

Itfs something the court
Having not even read the

Mr. Reece, notice of this hearing was

given two months ago.

10

MR. REECE:

That's correct.

11

THE COURT:

And you filed an appearance more than a

12

month ago.

13

memorandum fewer than 24 hours before the hearing?

14

Why is it that you are only filing your trial

MR. REECE:

Ifm —

my schedule, Your Honor, and Ifm

15

lucky I got it to the court (inaudible) even before the

16

hearing.

17

THE COURT:

Well, Ifm not going to consider it for

It f s unrealistic.

18

this hearing.

19

requirements of the rules.

20

think is a poor decision and you end up going on appeal and

21

spending your client's money for appeal instead of getting

22

things into the court here on time, I guess that's one way to

23

approach it.

24
25

MR. REECE:
request?

And it doesn't meet the

And if that results in what you

So the court's (inaudible) review on

1

THE COURT:

2

I don't even know what the matter is other

than a little bit that I have heard here.

3

Now, Miss Hjelle, you say that these are things that

4

are raised by your petition, but what is this process that you

5

are undertaking by this notice of petition and hearing?

6

MS. HJELLE:

Your Honor, under the water conservancy

7

act, which begins at 17 (a)-2-1401, there is a provision by

8

which I would refer the court to 17 (a)-2-1442.

9

be a highlighted version.

This happens to

And I have to admit, I didn't make

10

an extra copy.

11

But perhaps that would clarify things for the court.

12

I

It's just highlighted some of the language.

Essentially, we are empowered to bring a petition for what I

13

would call the equivalent of declaratory judgment and an action

14

taken by our board.

15

last sentence of this section, it looks like another of the

16

legislature's attempts to create some kind of process in the

17

court without reference to any of the rules of the court.

18

I

Well, until we get to the second to the

Then

it says, "The Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern and matters

19

of pleading and practice where not otherwise specified herein."

20

So from this statute you are taking it that a petition itself

21

can be considered just upon a notice of hearing, the notice of

22

hearing being specified in the statute or at least the notice

23

of filing specified.

24

reference to a notice of hearing on the petition, in the way

25

this is phrased.

And there's sort of a backhanded

And then, what is the court supposed to do?

1

Is this a trial?

2

asking me to guess what the legislature was thinking, if they

3

were thinking at all, when they passed this sort of thing?

4

Is it a motion hearing?

What is it?

You are

I guess -- maybe ITm oversimplifying it.

MS. HJELLE:

5

But I think if you would allow me to begin my argument and

6

begin it, see how far I get with it.

7

THE COURT:

8

we are in.

9

petition?

10

Am I being asked to grant a motion or to grant a
What do you think the procedure is that we are

MS. HJELLE:

THE COURT:

14

MS. HJELLE:

16
17

Yes, you are being asked to grant a

petition.

13

15

I'm still wondering about what procedure

following?

11
12

To me it's --

minute?

Okay.
May I refer with my client for just one

He seems to desire to say something.
MR. THOMPSON:

Do you mind if I add to the court and

make this a little more informal?

18

THE COURT:

Do you mind?

19

MR. REECE:

I don't mind, Your Honor.

20

MR. THOMPSON:

The reason this was in the water

21

conservancy statute is the district's not just ours, but around

22

the state we are dealing with financing and water contracts and

23

rules that had brought public interest.

24

they, in fact, were going to be legal and enforceable, because

25

they were borrowing large amounts of money.

They had to know that

They were building

significant infrastructure.

And so the purpose of this section

was to provide a way that when the board took an action, they
could go ask where it was important, ask the court for
declaratory judgment that what they had done was either legal
or illegal, so that they didn't move forward in an arena on
shaky legal grounds.

And I think what the legislature, at

least my understanding this has always been, that their
intent -- and we have used this on a couple of other occasions,
particularly in some financing —

what the court -- what the

legislature was concerned about is that as you are building in
this infrastructure, and the courts have been (inaudible) the
water system, that there would be a way that people depending
on it knew that the action was final, it was legal and
non-appealable so you had some certainty that that action
wasn't just a whim of an appointed body, but you had kind of a
second look at that, a fairly quick look at it, so that as you
move forward making those policies or entering the contracts
that you knew they were going to be valid and enforceable.
That was the purpose of the statute and the reason that that
was in there.

And you see it used in districts, particularly

seeing it used extensively in the Central Utah Project and
other places.

And we have used it on occasion rarely.

THE COURT:

You mentioned something like a declaratory

judgment process.
MR. THOMPSON:

Well, it really is a declaratory

1

judgment.

This is what it is.

2

think we followed the statute correctly.

3

of the background what's passed.

4

used in (inaudible) around the state.

5

THE COURT:

6

MS. HJELLE:

Okay.

Now, whether we -- you know, we
That was the intent

And that's how it's being

Thank you.

Your Honor, if I may make a couple of

7

other points.

And I may not have the citation with me.

8

there is a section of this statute that is sequential to 1442.

9

I thought I had made copies, but I am having a hard time
Oh, wait.

10

finding it.

11

which there may arise a validity —

12

cetera, et cetera —

13

say, "the question shall be advanced as a matter of immediate

14

public interest and concern and heard at the earliest practical

15

moment.

16

this part."

(Inaudible) 1444.

a question of validity," et
Let's

The court shall be open at all times for purposes of
Secondly, I would like to submit --

MR. THOMPSON:

18

THE COURT:

Separation of branches.

I'm not sure that's a concept that exists.

At least not in the constitution of Utah.

20

MS. HJELLE:

It's certainly my understanding under a

21

stipulation —

22

signed and returned to opposing counsel.

23

opposing counsel's signature.

24

MR. REECE:

25

"All cases in

I'll skip all this kind of thing.

17

19

1444.

But

got a —

and this is my copy of the stipulation that I
It doesn't have

But I assume there is one.

There is one.

In fact, Your Honor, I've

it should have been (inaudible) by this court.

1

THE COURT:

I think I saw this in the file.

2

MR. REECE:

(Inaudible) signed copy of the order

3
4

yesterday.
THE COURT:

Oh, that's where it was.

5

yesterday with the order.

6

have seen it.

7

I received it

I'm not sure where it is.

But I

Thank you.

MS. HJELLE:

It was certainly my understanding that we

8

had a stipulation that the portion of the hearing on whether or

9

not this is an impact fee could go forward today.

And,

10

frankly, I'm a little bit unprepared to even hear that there

11

was an objection to having a hearing.

12

course, counsel has the trial memorandum.

13

reason for it.

14
15
16
17

But

THE COURT:

I think that —

And maybe that's the

—
Well, it says the court shall be open at

all times.
MS. HJELLE:

(Inaudible.)

I don't know if that's good

to submit to you or not.

18

MR. REECE:

(Inaudible), Your Honor.

19

THE COURT:

Okay.

So you planned then to present oral

20

argument or any evidence also?

21

not in dispute, it's a question of interpretation?

22

of

MS. HJELLE:

Or is it really the evidence

I don't think the evidence is in dispute.

23

I think probably —

24

there was some clarity.

25

that could be something that can be ruled on at the time.

obviously, I have Mr. Thompson here if
If we got to that point, I suppose
But

1

my anticipation will be that we would make our arguments and

2

the court would rule on what it could rule on today, and you

3

would make that decision.

4

can't.

5

are not that complex, that they are pretty straight forward,

6

that you can make that simple narrow question ruling on that

7

simple narrow question today, and that the rest of the issues

8

raised -- counsel has the opportunity to bring those up to you

9

in oral argument.

I mean, if it can T t be done, it

I still have hope of persuading you that these issues

(Inaudible) convince you that they are

10

significant enough or add some complexity that I don't think is

11

there, then, perhaps, we may need to have a continuance.

12

think this could be ruled on today based on the material facts

13

that are before you in the petition and the exhibits.

14
15

THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

But I

Let's go ahead with

your presentation then.

16

MS. HJELLE:

All right.

Thank you, Your Honor.

I

17

appreciate that.

I won't belabor the point that we filed a

18

petition.

19

final rules and regulations of the secondary retail water

20

service for the LaVerkin Creek area.

21

engineer's study.

22

copy we brought with us today for you on that.

23

I indicated earlier, we think it's a very simple question of

24

looking at the salient, the relevant language.

25

regulation.

The attachment to the petition, Your Honor, is the

In addition, there is an

And I think I already handed you that, the
At any rate, as

It's a long

But I think we can focus in on the material parts

1

of the regulation and look at whether those indeed meet or do

2

not meet the terms that make them an impact fee.

3

thatfs a simple question that we are submitting to you today.

4

So I think

If I could just give you, if I could, some background

5

of why we did this and how we got here.

6

obviously, is charged with conserving and developing water for

7

the people in Washington County.

8

business.

9

we'll go about conserving and developing and providing water.

10

I

The water district,

But we have our ways of doing

And, under law, we are entitled to determine how

And, fundamentally, the water district is a wholesaler, for

11

lack of a better term.

12

sell to individuals, individual lots, individual developments

13

even for the most part.

14

municipalities.

15

they do with it.

16

arrangements and the like.

17

companies.

18

aren't relevant here today.

19

is the way I would put that.

20

In other words, we do not go out and

We primarily provide water to

And then they go on and do whatever business
We primarily do that by way of contractual
We also have some irrigation

And there are some exceptional situations that
So we are a wholesaler of waters,

In that vane, sometime ago, we entered into an

21

agreement with the town of Toquerville and the Toquerville

22

secondary —

23

a system for secondary water, irrigation water within the town

24

of Toquerville.

25

organization called Toquerville Secondary Water System was

and the Toquerville Irrigation Company to provide

And to do that, the board was created.

And an

1

created.

2

infrastructure and, in order to ensure payment, basically

3

retains title to the infrastructure while payment is being

4

made.

5

be owned and operated by the town of Toquerville.

6

that entity we call TSWS, is two members are appointed by the

7

water district.

8

Toquerville.

9

Toquerville for a fifth member.

10

And the district financed and constructed the

But, over time, the intention is that that system would

Toquerville.

11

The board of

Two members are appointed by the town of

Then those four members select a water user in
So it is dominated by

But the district certainly has a voice.

Okay.

So that system has been put in place and is now

12

serving within the town of Toquerville.

13

apparent to us that Keystone Development would be likely coming

14

to the district rather than to TSWS to obtain secondary -- I

15

guess, I mean we are presuming secondary water service within

16

J

However, it became

the city limits of Toquerville where we already have this other

17

system in place.

18

appropriate to rationally evaluate whether and on what terms it

19

I

So the district basically felt it was

would ever do something outside of what is already done through

20

TSWS.

And that's what these regulations really are.

They are

21

the district's attempt to figure out how to respond in a

22

rational way to appending requests that we can see coming in

23

the door.

24

Initially, when we looked at it, we more or less

25

presumed that this would be an impact fee type situation.

And

1

we started down that road.

2

trying to meet the terms of that statute, it became pretty

3

apparent to me that it was something like fitting a square peg

4

in a round hole.

5

doing and the terms of that statute.

6

like to focus on before the court right now.

7

But, as digging into this and

Nothing really jived between what we were
And that's what I would

First of all, I would like to give to the court, if I

8

could, a few of the definitions that I think are the relevant

9

definitions from the statute.

10

And, first of all, I would like

to focus on the definition of Utah code section 1136-102-7 (a)

11

I

in impact fee.

And I think this is the really central part of

12

J

our argument, Your Honor.

13

J

imposed upon a development activity as a condition of

14

J

development approval.

An impact fee is a payment of money

To really jump ahead of my argument,

15

what we are really telling you is when we get to our

16

regulations —

17

time -- we don't ever have anything in there that says before

18

I

and I have the salient parts to hand you at that

you can develop you must pay us money or in order to be able to

19

develop you must pay us money.

20

from there, Your Honor.

21

bit.

22

It's not there.

So I'll go on

It's kind of jumping ahead a little

But, fundamentally, in order for us to impose an

23

impact fee, we must be able to be in a position to approve or

24

disapprove a development activity or be causally linked --

25

jumping to what I know is in their trial brief -- causally

1

linked, you could say, to approval or disapproval to a

2

development activity.

3

Now, the next step, addition I would like to focus on,

4

is number three.

Development activity means any construction

5

or expansion of a building, structure, or use, any change in

6

use of a building, structure, or any change in use of the land

7

that creates additional demand and need for public facilities.

8

So, there again, the district must be able to approve or

9

disapprove construction, expansion, change and use of a

10

building, structures, or land to simplify that definition down.

11

Furthermore, it is that, those activities which might -- which

12

would create a demand and need for public facilities.

13

leads me to the third definition I would like to focus the

14

court on, which is the definition of public facilities.

15

you look at that definition, the -- there are the following

16

capital facilities that have a life expectancy of 10 or more

17

years and are owned or operated by or on behalf of a political

18

subdivision.

19

includes water supply and distribution facilities, okay, which

20

is essentially what the issue is again, kind of jumping ahead.

21

I wouldn't have brought this up except I know it's in the trial

22

memorandum, and this is the only other issue I could see that

23

would be relevant, in my opinion, from that.

24
25

So that

And if

And I would focus you on subpart (a), which is,

Now, so the facilities in question here, well, I'll
skip that, because it really becomes relevant when we look at

1

our regulation.

2

think are relevant.

3

district is not approving development as defined there.

4

would like to look at our regulation now, if I could, Your

5

Honor.

6
7

10

But those are the definitions that I

So our position simply is that the

There are two parts to this.
I

And I

And I'll just give them

both to you at the same time, if I can get these separated.

8
9

Okay.

(Inaudible) these are just, counsel, out of our
regulation, that paragraph five you alluded to in your memo and
it f s attached exhibit.

11

Your Honor, I would like to first focus on Exhibit A.

12

This is a fee structure.

13

forth, when -- what triggers the imposition of the fee, for

14

lack of a better way of putting it.

15

Okay.

And this is the exhibit that sets

Now, looking at Exhibit A, paragraph one, the

16

initial water availability fee is due and payable when the

17

developer requests water service.

18

concerned, as a water district, he could have a subdivision

19

approved, he could not have a subdivision approved; he could

20

have his plat drafted, he could not have his draft platted.

21

It's his decision when he comes in and asks us for water

22

service.

23

might say, I want a subdivision.

24

Instead, I want to get my water from the water district.

25

before I even start platting out my subdivision, I want to

Okay.

Now, as far as we are

I could speculate, for example, that a developer
I don't want to go to TSWS.
And

1

address.
Okay.

2

So, at that point, that's when th ey make that

Now, what is the I^ater availabi lity fee ?

3

re quest.

4

is not an invo luntary 1thing that we have control over.

5

is , once again r a si.tuation where f or some reason someone wants

6

to volunt arily come to us and wants us to voluntarily provide

7

them with water; at which point, we forego opportunities to

8

market that water elsewhere.

9

utilize our pipes.

We can take water in our pipes all over the

10

county ultimately.

I mean, Ifm simplifying it down.

11

fundamentally, when we put a pipeline in place, it has a

12

certain capacity, and somebody comes to us and asks for water,

13

and we say we will give you water.

14

plans on that basis.

15

way.

16

are already in place or they intend to build them, we are

17

reserving the water, we are reserving, you know, planning

18

infrastructure and so forth.

19

thing as what's referred to as an impact fee.

20

Well, this
This

We forego opportunities to

But,

Go ahead and make your

We r ve got to reserve that water in some

And we have devoted facilities regardless of whether they

I don ! t think that ! s the same

Now, then again, I would like to reiterate the point

21

that it's all voluntary.

Okay.

I would also like to point out

22

to the court while we are on this point, that we think that

23

this type of arrangement is mandated by another section of

24

water conservancy district statute, section 17(a)-2-1432 .

25

perhaps without belaboring the point, it talks about the need

And

1

what I presented to you is what we do with regard to -- I mean,

2

our regulation states that there is nothing lurking out there

3

with regard to TSWS.

4

fundamentally, it's just a water system that's managed by that

5

board.

I do have the contract but,

And we don't have any approval or authorities that

6

I

aren't -- and I guess I think, still, that's pretty irrelevant

7

I

because, once again, it comes back to somebody not wanting to
go through any of those other routes, whatever they may be, out

9

|

in the world for doing their business.

10

|

us and ask us for service which we, fundamentally, are not

11

|

desiring to provide given the resources that we have to provide

12

I

for other obligations to the public.

13

All right.

Do they want to come to

So --

Now, I would just like to go back to

14

Exhibit A, if I could, Your Honor.

Number two is a standby

15

fee.

16

to the system.

17

separately set forth these provisions of the regulations.

18

the regulations basically provide that if you wanted to connect

19

to our system and get water from us in this secondary

20

irrigation water, then you got to meet our standards in

21

constructing your pipes.

22

it over and so on, so forth.

23

essentially, as folks come and say we want to be part of your

24

system, we are saying, fine.

25

And you look over our standards.

That is due and payable after construction of additions
I guess without, I haven't highlighted these or
But

And you got to have our engineer look
And then we own it.

So,

Pay the water availability fee.
And you construct at some

1

point, whenever.

2

At some point you construct the pipes, you meet our standards,

3

then you start paying the standby fee once we have approved the

4

construction and the addition of the pipeline system to our

5

system.

6

That's at their discretion when they do it.

Paragraph two of our regulations indicate that if a

7

community is unable to provide that water service, they have to

8

submit a letter asking for it.

9

That really relates back to paragraph one of Exhibit A, I

10

So there is a written request.

think.

11

THE COURT:

12

MS. HJELLE:

Um-hmm.
Item number three in Exhibit A is a

13

connection fee of $400 per lot.

14

service fee, which is related to actual service of water.

15

you switch from a standby fee to a higher fee that reflects the

16

fact that you are now hooked up to the system and receiving

17

water.

18

conditioned upon approval of development, of a development

19

(inaudible).

20

So that's it.

Then, thereafter, a water
So

None of these fees, clearly, are

It simply isnft part of the deal.

Now, I would like now to refer to the other little

21

page that I had handed you, which is actually an excerpt from

22

the regulations.

23

And, again, I mention that I allude to this because I was

24

alerted to the argument by the trial memorandum of counsel.

25

And to make an attempt to state their argument, they are

It is paragraph five from those regulations.

1

basically saying that if you look at the last phrase there,

2

that they have to pay the appropriate fees prior to

3

construction of any intended additions to the district system.

4

Now, they could construct other irrigation systems that aren't

5

going to connect to ours.

6

connect to TSWS or whatever.

7

connect to our system through this process that's outlined in

8

these regulations, then they have to sign these water

9

application and agreements for each lot, which provides some

We have nothing to do with that.
But if they are intending to

10

legally binding ability for us to collect what we need to

11

collect and manage it in the way we need to manage it.

12

The argument, as I understand it, is that somehow

13

makes this an impact fee because there is a required approval

14

prior to that construction.

15

definitions page that I initially argued from.

16

the top 11-36-102 definitions.

17

Or

I

But this takes us back to the
It starts at

This gets back to the

definition both of public facilities and development activity

18

and development approval.

This kind of ties it altogether.

19

These pipes that are referred to in that paragraph five are not

20

development activities.

21

the development activities cause a need for, if you see where

22

I'm going.

23

activity.

24

however they choose to in accordance with whatever approvals

25

and regulations other entities have authority to grant or not

They are the public facilities that

So we are still not approving a development
These folks are engaging in development activity

1

grant.

2

system, then they are adding an infrastructure to our public

3

facility.

And we are saying that becomes part of our public

4

facility.

It will meet our standards and we will approve that.

5

But it's entirely different from a development activity.

6

that's why we don't think that argument has any merit when it

7

arises.

8
9

Or, when they come to us and want to connect to our

So

I guess, Your Honor, I've got a couple notes here
about the brief.

I think maybe I'll just summarize those by

10

saying that we think those are (inaudible) facts.

11

don't think what other water districts do in other situations,

12

what Toquerville does in its culinary water system, what other

13

municipalities do in their culinary water systems, what the

14

district might do in some other situation under separate

15

contract or whatever it might be are relevant.

16

relevant question is, what does our regulation say and what

17

does the statute say, and have we in fact made some payment of

18

fee a condition of development approval.

19

court that we have not.

20

to rule that this is not an impact fee.
THE COURT:

21
22
23

We simply

We think the

And we submit to the

And, therefore, it is a simple matter
Thank you, Your Honor.

What's the consequence if it is an impact

fee?
MS. HJELLE:

If it is an impact fee, we would do

24

something somewhat different from what we have done here.

25

There are more formalities.

And this gets back, Your Honor, to

1

my befuddlement in trying to meet the impact fee statute.

2

have to do what's called a capital facilities plan.

3

to give you an idea of why I ran into trouble as counsel for

4

the district, you have to do both a capital facilities plan and

5

an impact fee analysis.

6

go through some specific procedures of notice and the like and

7

hearings and the like.

8

are -- it is a strict procedure, for lack of a better term.

9

There are outlined procedures.

And just

There are two requirements.

So that simplifies it.

And you

But there

What we have done in this

10

instance is, we have done an analysis.

11

an analysis which might be similar to what an impact fee

12

analysis would be.

13

I

You

We had our engineer do

And I know that counsel would tell you that

they were critical of that, that it was not sufficient to meet

14

the standards of the impact fee analysis.

15

theoretically, be an issue if this were an impact fee.

16

don't have a capital facilities plan which is also required.

17

I

18

I

Now, okay.
moment here.

And that could,
And we

If the court would indulge me for just one

Before imposing impact fees, each local political

19

subdivision shall prepare a capital facilities plan.

20

shall identify demands placed upon an existing public

21

facilities by new development activity.

22

say, well, gosh.

23

district because we have existing contracts.

24

pipelines we are going to build.

25

water under contracts to municipalities.

The plan

I look at that.

And I

I don?t know how to do that for the water
And we have big

And we are going to sell
And they are going to

1

deal with the d evelopment withtin the ir borders, bo undaries.

2

aren' t directly relating what we do to development activity as

3

defined in this statute.

4

could forecast 1these kind s of things wh ich we have no plan of

5

doing •

6

We

So I was ver^r befuddled as to how we

The set apart is the proposed means by which the

7

political subdivision would meet those demands.

8

City of St. George is trying to figure out how to meet the

9

demands of the development which it approves within its

Same thing.

10

boundaries.

11

reservoirs, how to make, put pipelines in place that will

12

deliver quantities of water that St. George, at some point in

13

time, would ask us to deliver to them.

14

We are trying to figure out how to build

So, we have no plans of, you know, again, looking at

15

the definition of development activity, looking at what

16

buildings are going to be built, what structures are going to

17

be built and so forth.

18

with.

19

fundamentally, getting back to the question you asked, there

20

are procedures that are more elaborate.

That we leave to those we can contract

That f s a little (inaudible) from what you asked.

21

THE COURT:

22

MS. HJELLE:

But,

Okay.
And I guess to add one more point, if I

23

could, so we believe that our duty in passing this fee under

24

our water district statute is to be rational, I mean, is the

25

standard that applies to governmental entities in the actions

We can!t be so irrational that it would be

1

that they do.

2

appropriate for a court to come in and substitute its judgment

3

for the judgment of our court.

Thank you, Your Honor.

All right.

Mr. Reece.

4

THE COURT:

Okay.

5

MR. REECE:

Thank you, very much, Your Honor.

6

can just really carefully focus with you on these

7

definitions --

8

THE COURT:

Um-hmm.

9

MR. REECE:

—

If I

because I think that's where this case

10

really comes down, at least the issues what's before the court

11

today.

12

that Miss Hjelle produced, because I think these are a few

13

definitions that I think are applicable that are not included

14

in there.

15

I don f t know if you have that, i f the court has the new ones,

16

the 2001?

MR. REECE:

23
24
25

We have the 2000 in here today.

They

You know wh at, could I trouble the court

(inaudible) photocopies of that?

21
22

No.

will be gone by tomorrow.

19
20

I'm looking at page 440 of volume one of the code.

THE COURT:

17
18

And I!m not going to usei the exhibit that Mrs. -- or

What section are you looking

THE COURT:

Let's see.

MR, REECE:

Section Uta h Code 11-36-101 and 102 -- I'm

at?

sorry 101 and 201.
THE COURT:

Have they b een changed since 2000?

1
2

MR. REECE:
I

3

modified.

I guess not.

Sorry.

(Inaudible) ' been

I believe they are the same, Your Honor.

So I guess

we are okay (inaudible).

4

THE COURT:

All right.

5

MR. REECE:

Looking first at section 11-36-201 subpart

6

(1)(a), states that, "Each local subdivision shall comply with

7

the requirements of this chapter before establishing or

8

modifying any impact fee."

9

paragraphs before that, 101.

10
11

THE COURT:
I

definitions are?

12
13

(8) (a).

It f s 102, isn't it, where all the

101 is just the title.

MR. REECE:
I

You pop over to 101, just a couple

Yeah, I apologize.

101 -- 102, subsection

It states that, "Local political subdivisions means a

14

county, a municipality or a special district created under

15

title 17(a) special districts."

16

that's being advanced here today is because Washington County

17

Water Conservancy District is a special district, they don't

18

approve or disapprove development activity and, therefore, they

19

don't come within the meaning of the impact fee statute.

20

fact the statute itself includes them within this definition,

21

and suggests that the legislature, when they created this

22

statute, believed that special districts could in fact approve

23

or disapprove a development activity.

24

on subsection (7)(a), this is the citation of Miss Hjelle cited

25

earlier.

Now, part of the argument

The

Now, if you'll look up

States, "An impact fee means that payment of money

1

imposed upon" -- I'm going to put in quotes, "development

2

activity" as a condition of" -- I!m putting quotes again,

3

"development approval."

4

I

Now, those sections of the code, development approval

5

states, means any written authorization from a local political

6

subdivision -- that would include a special district -- that

7

authorizes the commencement of development activity.

8

say to give final plat approval or to give plat approval or

9

give even preliminary plat approval.

Doesn't

It just says that

10

authorizes upon -- sorry, written authorization from a

11

political subdivision that authorizes commencement of a

12

development activity.

13

that, "Any development activity means any construction or

14

expansion of a building, structure, or use; any change in use

15

of a building or structure; or any changes in the use of the

16

land that creates a (inaudible) demand and need for public

17

facility."

18

come to the board of the district and say will you please give

19

me subdivision approval so I can put in this water facility.

20

That's not what the statute requires.

21

pay a fee before you can go ahead with any development

22

activity, that fee then, by definition, if it is paid to a

23

political subdivision, which would include specifically include

24

a district, service district, that fee is an impact fee.

25

Now, subsection (3) above that states

So we are not in a situation here where we have to

It says if you have to

And as a result of that, you have to have a capital

1

facilities plan.

2

of capital facilities plans.

3

them.

4

their structure.

5

I

And the court, I'm sure, is very much aware

They are detailed.

Every political subdivision has

They show what they cost to build

What do they have right now?

cost to build the duct right now?

What does it

I might add, in my trial

6

memorandum —

7

has its capital facilities plan with their impact fees and

8

their impact fee analysis.

9

I

10
11

trial brief, the Weber Water Conservancy District

The Ash Creek Service District has

a capital facilities plan with their fees.

Service districts,

water districts, whether it be Weber, Washington County, it
J

doesn't matter, they oftentimes do have fees they impose as a

12

condition of commencement of a development activity.

13

again, that does not mean final plat approval or preliminary

14

plat approval for a development.

15

want to put in a system for secondary water and use us, you got:

16

to pay a fee before you put that system in, which is exactly

17

what these regulations require.

18

And,

It just means that if you

Now, if I can, further, the other paragraphs that I

19

think are relevant here, Miss Hjelle pointed to paragraph 11 of

20

102 —

21

about, specifically, only the following capital facilities that

22

have a life expectancy of 10 or more years, and are owned or

23

operated by or on behalf of a local political subdivision;

24

namely, water supply and distribution facilities.

25

read through their regulations, when we put in these

102, yeah, about public facilities.

And that talks

Well, if you

1

are asking us to pay for the entire costs of those facilities.

2

That's why that's different.

3

purview of the impact fee statutes, Your Honor.

4
5

THE COURT:

That's why it comes within the

Well, go ahead and continue.

I would like

to see the connection of the system improvements.

6

MR. REECE:

Even if you just look at strictly the

7

public facilities part of that, Your Honor, they are asking us

8

to put in water, it will affect, and then they will then own

9

the water rights, the water supply, treatment, and treatment

10

facilities.

11

event.

12

thing, Your Honor -- hang on a second, here —

13

this to the court, is there is a special agreement that the

14

water district has with my client that they will in fact

15

produce the water for my client, supply the water for my

16

client, not the TSWS or anybody else, that they will provide

17

that water on the benefit -- on behalf of my client.

18

you what's been marked as an agreement --

19

It comes squarely within paragraph 11(a) in any

And I think what's kind of ironic about this whole

MS. HJELLE:

and I'll submit

I hand

Your Honor, I would like to object to

20

this.

21

question of whether our regulation meets the definition of an

22

impact fee.

23

has nothing to do with the petition and the issue before the

24

court today.

25

I don't see how this agreement is relevant to the

I think you are opening up a whole new area that

THE COURT:

What is the connection, Mr. Reece?

1

MR. REECE:

This specifically requires them, or

2

requires them to produce water for my client.

3

argument is we don't have to produce the water unless you

4

request it.

5

required to produce the water for my client.

6

Part of our

Well, that's inaptable to my client.

MS. HJELLE:

They are

Your Honor, there are issues of this -- I

7

mean, first of all, is irrelevant.

I mean, even if we had some

8

obligation, which we are prepared to deal with this fully, and

9

I think this really relates to the issues of their complaint

10

that we stipulated would be addressed at a later date.

11

fully prepared to address this, but -- I don't know.

12

it's just not relevant to the question of whether we have an

13

impact fee.

14

some contractual obligation, which we do not, to do that, first

15

of all, we have TSWS.

16

secondly, it's still a voluntary situation that they entered

17

into by contract.

18

relevant to the question of whether our regulation, which is

19

not solely focused on them, admittedly, a response to an

20

anticipated request from them.

21

public regulation of the water district.

22

separate issue.

23

We are
You know,

Assuming their argument is correct, and we had

MR. REECE:

And we have fulfilled that.

But,

It's not the kind of situation that is

But it is a broadly applicable
This contract is a

It's specifically against the issue of

24

whether they say, well, you want water, it's request for fee.

25

It's not.

We need to get the water from them.

They know that.

1

re gulations on how we put that: secondary system in.

What pipe

2

we use, whether the Atsh C reek Service District is going to be

3

involved as well.

4

or whatever.

5

to comply wi th before we can g o through and get that final plat

6

approval.

7

Honor —

8

have to pay Washington County Water Service District, that was

9

a pass-through fee to Toquerville Secondary Water System, that

Whethe r we put the right thickness of p ipe

They have a whol e litany of reiquirements we have

Now, whether the Toquerville -- even if, Your
hold your thought (inaudible) -- but even if we didn!t

10

doesn't lessen the fact that it's a condition of development

11

activity.

12

THE COURT:

Well, I think what Ifm getting from your

13

argument is a little bit different interpretation of the terms

14

"development activity" and "development approval."

15

If I can state your argument the way I understand it,

16

you say you are being required by the district to pay money.

17

You say that is imposed upon your development activity.

18

say that that development activity is the creation of a

19

subdivision.

20

Toquerville?

You

You say that the city or town -- which is it,

21

MR. REECE:

It's a city now.

22

THE COURT:

City?

You say that the city requires you

23

to have these public facilities in in order to have, to get the

24

city's authority to commence your development activity, which

25

is development of the subdivision, and, therefore, since the

1
2

development approval is a written authorization from a local
J

political subdivision, which is the city, to authorize your

3

development of a subdivision, and that development of the

4

subdivision creates the need for public facilities, then the

5

I

fee imposed by a second political subdivision is still just

6

J

necessarily an impact fee even though that second political

7

I

subdivision, the water district has nothing to do with

8

I

approving your development at all.

9

Of course it approves the

construction that connects to its own facilities.

10

MR. REECE:

Sure.

11

THE COURT:

You wouldn f t expect someone to be able to

12

say I need some electrical power and I ! ll tell Utah Power &

13

Light -- in the olden days -- how I ! m going to hook it up, and

14

they'll just have to like it or lump it.

15

with everything Utah Power & Light requires back in those days,.

16

So is that what you are saying, Mr. Reece?

17

MR. REECE:

You'd have to comply

In essence, when they —

when the district

18

says to us, okay, put in a secondary system, you have to do

19

this, this, and this, and you need to pay us this water -- I

20

forget how they call it, this water application fee, before you

21

can begin that and follow our regulations on what you put in

22

there, that is part and parcel of the whole development

23

process.

24

a condition of final plat approval or not.

25

even at a later time and say, okay, maybe now we want to put in

And it doesn't matter whether we have to have that as
If we come back

1

position to do anything about it.

All right.

2

Miss Hjelle, what's your final argument on this?

3

MS. HJELLE:

Your Honor, I don ! t want to belabor.

I

4

think most of the points that Mr. Reece raised were addressed

5

in my original argument.

6

I would like to just articulate one point in

7

particular.

The issue of the fact that local districts are

8

J

special districts are referenced in the impact fee statute.

9

I

recognize that there could be circumstances under which we

10

—
We

would have to do an impact fee analysis and capital facilities

11

I

plan.

Those would be circumstances where there is, for lack of

12

I

a better term, a causal relationship between the approval of

13

J

development activity and some action that we have to agree to

14

do.

And in the examples that Mr. Reece has given you, are

15

exactly on point.

16

the municipalities or the areas where they provide service,

17

obviously, you have to have a sewer facility of some sort to

18

get a building permit.

19

with the areas where they provide service that they will do

20

that.

21

And there you get the impact fee analysis connection.

22

voluntarily put ourselves in that position with regard to that

23

there's —

24

development approval, that would be a different situation.

25

we haven't done that here.

You take Ash Creek Special Service District,

And so they are contractually connected

And so they are going to impact the causal relationship.
If we

that our service is required in order to get
But

1

Toquerville has a separate way of providing all of

2

these things.

It has nothing to do with us except in so far,

3

you might say, as our indirect link with TSWS.

4

Your Honor, it is not a direct link because Toquerville

5

requires, as I understand it, that a developer place the pipes

6

in the ground.

That it does not require a connection to

7

receive water.

So even there, the question of coming to us and

8

asking for water would still be a step removed from any

9

approval development activity.

And even there,

But there again, there is no

10

linkage between the development approvals issued by the city of

11

Toquerville in anything we are doing in these regulations that

12

are before you today.

13

another.

14

cases where there is a relationship.

15

They simply have no relationship to one

And these other cases that he has brought up are

THE COURT:

So, but you are -- you are then

16

contemplating a possibility where there are two local -- what's

17

the term —

18

approval of a building permit is conditioned on another's

19

approval of a sewer hookup and, therefore, the fee for the

20

sewer hookup should be determined to be an impact fee?

21

local political subdivisions involved, and one's

MS. HJELLE:

I think there are circumstances that have

22

to be dealt with on their own merits.

And we certainly aren't

23

saying there aren't circumstances where we wouldn't potentially

24

have to do something like that.

25

this is one of them.

We, obviously, don't think

We think this is, obviously, on its face,

